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THE DILEMMA OF THE LOCAL SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT: AN ESSAY ON 'SOCIALLY 
RESPONSIBLE' INVESTING 
Edward A. Zelinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
Like any political movement that seeks to change the status quo 
in a dramatic way, the drive for the "socially responsible" investment 
of pension and endowment funds has generated many questions about 
the nature, scope, and propriety of its aims. Among the varied issues 
that have emerged from the debate over social investing, perhaps none 
has been more sharply argued than the propriety of such investing as 
evaluated under the traditional criteria of fiduciary law. 
Historically, fiduciaries have been required to diversify the assets 
under their control and to seek the highest rate of return consistent 
with the preservation of those assets.' Some opponents of social in­
vesting contend that the often suggested criteria for social investments 
will inhibit the diversification of fiduciaries' portfolios and will lead to 
lower rates of return than would otherwise be obtainable.^ If, for ex­
ample, a pension plan cannot invest in nonunion companies, the uni­
verse of available investments will be constricted. Under this analysis, 
the pension trustee proscribed from making profitable nonunion in­
vestments will develop a less diverse and less profitable portfolio than 
the trustee not so proscribed. 
To the proponents of social investing, there is no insuperable in­
compatibility between the investment criteria they propose and the 
fiduciary's traditional obligations to diversify and make productive 
the funds under his control.^ Diversification, under this view, can be 
achieved with relatively few investments. From this perspective, there 
is no reason to believe that companies with factories in South Africa 
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will necessarily have higher rates of return than firms with no estab­
lishments in that country. 
As a modest contribution to this debate, I suggest that the rela­
tionship among social investing, diversification, and rates of return 
can best be evaluated if we distinguish between two types of social 
investments: the "local" social investment and the "global" social in­
vestment. The former is an investment that, in addition to its direct 
rate of return, generates secondary economic benefits for the fiduci­
ary's beneficiaries. In many instances, the local social investment will, 
because of these extra benefits, yield a higher rate of return than more 
traditional investments. On the other hand, the local social invest­
ment—precisely because of its local nature—will be among the least 
diversifying of the investments available to the fiduciary. The para­
dox of the local social investment—its high rate of return but undiver-
sified nature—forms the core of my analysis. 
Central to my position is the concept, widely accepted among 
economists but as yet unfamiliar to fiduciary law, of the externality, 
i.e., the secondary financial benefit generated by an economic activity. 
It is not surprising that the jurisprudence of fiduciary obligation has 
not addressed the question of externalities since that body of law 
traces its origins to a preurbanized, preindustrial world where exter­
nalities were less common than they are today."* 
I suggest that the fiduciary's obligation to maximize his rate of 
return is appropriately characterized as an obligation to maximize a 
rate of return that includes the beneficiary's portion of any externali­
ties. So defined, the fiduciary's obligations would not simply permit, 
but often would compel, the local social investment on the basis of 
rate of return. Phrased differently, the rate of return on the local so­
cial investment, calculated to account for its externalities to the bene­
ficiary, will often be higher than the return on traditional, nonsocial 
investments. 
Life, however, is never simple. While local social investments 
will often be the most productive investments available to a fiduciary, 
generally they will also be the least diversifying. Typically, the fiduci­
ary will already have a major investment in the locality to be benefited 
by the proposed local social investment. Thus, ironically, one tradi­
tional criterion of fiduciary law (rate of return) will frequently impel 
the fiduciary to make local social investments while another criterion 
(diversification) will generally forbid it. This is the dilemma of the 
local social investment. 
See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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To resolve this dilemma, I propose that a specific category of 
investments be recognized as a matter of fiduciary law. This category 
would be denoted "reciprocal local social investments" and would re­
flect the fiduciary's power (and perhaps compulsion) to make the local 
social investment of another fiduciary in return for that second fiduci­
ary's agreement to make a reciprocal investment of the assets under 
his control. 
I will develop my analysis in seven steps. First, I will create four 
examples that will be used throughout this Article. Second, I will 
examine the background of social investing and will amplify the dis­
tinction between the local social investment and the global social in­
vestment. Third, I will briefly explore the legal framework presently 
controlling the investment obligations of fiduciaries. Fourth, I will 
analyze the economist's concept of the externality. Fifth, I will ex­
amine how the local social investment, because of its externalities, will 
often be the most productive, if least diversifying, investment avail­
able to the fiduciary. Sixth, I will introduce the concept of the recip­
rocal local social investment as an addition to the body of fiduciary 
law and will outline the manner in which a nationwide clearinghouse 
could facilitate the reciprocation of local social investments. Finally, 
I will examine some potential objections to my analysis. 
I. FOUR EXAMPLES 
To advance my various themes, I will utilize four examples. The 
first involves a university located in an urban setting in the city of 
Westville, a middle-sized community in New England. The univer­
sity is well endowed. The most recent valuation of the university's 
investment portfolio concluded that the university's income produc­
ing assets are worth $300 million. The campus itself is a major hold­
ing of the university, valued by the local assessor at $100 million. 
Parts of the university's campus abut the downtown area of Westville. 
In recent years, the downtown area has stagnated. Of the university's 
investment portfolio, $50 million represents commercial real estate in 
downtown Westville. 
To revitalize downtown, the city of Westville recruits an exper­
ienced out-of-state developer to acquire, refurbish, and upgrade sev­
eral blocks of downtown real estate. The developer needs financing. 
More particularly, the developer needs a mortgage below market rates 
for his proposal to work. The developer and the city approach the 
university for a loan for the developer. That loan would be made 
from the university's endowment fund and would be in the amount of 
$10 million, for ten years, at an 8% rate of return. The proceeds 
114 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:111 
would be invested exclusively in the developer's downtown project. 
The university's endowment advisors indicate that, if the university 
rejects the loan request, it could obtain 10% return by investing the 
funds elsewhere. 
There is no local source available for the proposed mortgage 
other than the university's endowment. If the university does not 
agree to the city's proposal, there will apparently be no downtown 
project.^ 
At the same time that the university has before it the proposal 
from the city and the developer, the university is being pressured by 
certain segments of its student body to divest the stocks of specified 
corporations that depend heavily on military contracts. These stocks 
currently generate a return of 10%. The university's advisors believe 
that, if these stocks are sold, the proceeds could not be reinvested at 
that rate of return and would therefore generate a lesser income to the 
university. 
My second example pertains to the profit-sharing plan of a cor­
poration that is in the home construction business in the industrial 
midwest. Under the terms of the plan, one-third of the corporation's 
pretax profits are automatically contributed to the plan. The plan sat­
isfies the legal requirements of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") 
for profit-sharing arrangements.^ The participants in the plan are the 
employees of the corporation who have attained twenty-five years of 
age. The corporation's nonmanagement employees are paid on an 
hourly basis. The president and the treasurer of the corporation serve 
as trustees for the assets contributed to the plan. 
In Elmtown, the community where the corporation does the bulk 
of its business, the homebuilding market has stagnated because of 
high mortgage rates and the lack of available mortgage money. Con­
sequently, for the past three years, the corporation has had no profits 
and thus has made no contribution to the profit-sharing plan. Indeed, 
most nonmanagement employees of the corporation have been work­
ing substantially less than forty hours per week. 
The corporation is approached by its employees with the follow­
ing proposal: The trustees will sell certain long-term corporate bonds 
held by the profit-sharing plan. The plan earns a rate of return of 
' For those who suspect that this example is something of a roman d clef, see Yale Chips 
in For New Haven, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, § 4, at E7, col. 3; Yale Ponders Shubert Invest­
ment, New Haven Reg., Nov. 20, 1982, at 30, col. 3. In the interests of full disclosure, I should 
note that I serve as a member of the Board of Aldermen of New Haven and voted for the city's 
participation in both of the projects described in these articles. 
6 I.R.C. § 401. All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
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13% on these bonds. These bonds total $2 million and represent one-
tenth of the plan's current assets. The proceeds from the sale of the 
bonds will be conveyed to a local savings bank that will, on behalf of 
the plan, loan the proceeds for new home construction mortgages in 
Elmtown. For the first three years, each mortgage will bear an inter­
est rate of 11%, 2% less than the return the plan could otherwise 
obtain. In the fourth year, and for each year thereafter, each mort­
gage's interest rate will automatically adjust to market levels. Hence, 
the prospective mortgagor will receive a subsidy during the first three 
years he owns his house. 
While the trustees contemplate this proposal, they are asked by a 
local environmental group to divest their portfolio of all securities is­
sued by companies that produce certain artificial pesticides, and to 
invest the proceeds in the newly issued stock of a corporation that 
produces experimental equipment for industrial solar heating compo­
nents designed for Florida and other southern states. The securities 
proposed for divestiture bear an average rate of return of 15%. The 
stock of the solar equipment company is highly speculative, as the 
company has yet to pay any dividends. 
My third example involves the pension plan maintained by a na­
tional, nonprofit church organization for its full-time salaried employ­
ees. The organization provides a variety of administrative and 
educational services to local, affiliated churches. Affiliation is purely 
voluntary and may be terminated by the church at any time. The 
organization's pension plan satisfies the requirements of the Internal 
Revenue Code' and is of the defined benefit variety,® i.e., upon attain­
ing age 65, each employee is guaranteed a specific annual pension re­
gardless of the plan's investment performance during the employee's 
working career. In particular, each employee is assured, upon his re­
tirement, an annual pension equal to 60% of his average yearly salary 
as of the end of his employment. 
Each year, the plan's professional actuary determines the level of 
funding that the organization must contribute to the plan. The organ­
ization's funds come from two major sources. First, each affiliated 
church makes a mandatory payment based on the size of the church's 
congregation. In addition, the organization's staff conducts direct-
7 Id. 
8 In a defined benefit pension plan, the employer pays a specified benefit at the employee's 
retirement. Such benefit is calculated from a formula that is part of the plan. The employer's 
contribution is based on an actuarial valuation of how much money will be needed to fund the 
promised benefit upon the employee's retirement. Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris Decision, 
Its Implications and Application, 32 Drake L. Rev. 913, 934 (1983). 
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mail fundraising appeals principally aimed at the congregants of the 
affiliated churches. 
Throughout its history, the organization has been involved in a 
number of political and religious controversies. Frequently, affiliated 
churches have responded to these controversies by terminating or sus­
pending their memberships in the organization. The organization's 
income is directly and adversely affected when a church departs in 
this fashion. 
To protect the plan's participants, the church organization has 
elected to participate in the federally sponsored insurance program of 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).® In return for an 
annual premium, the PBGC insures a basic retirement benefit for each 
participant in the plan. 
The following proposal has been advanced to the plan's trustees: 
$10 million of the pension assets under their control will be loaned to 
churches that are located in impoverished rural and urban areas 
throughout the nation, and that are in the process of erecting new 
buildings or expanding or improving old ones. The trustees, as secur­
ity for the loans, will receive mortgages from the borrowing churches. 
The churches will each borrow at an 8% rate of return for a ten-year 
term. This is 2% less than the return the trustees could otherwise 
obtain. Each borrowing church will enter into a contract with the 
organization, committing the church to affiliate with the organization 
until its loan is paid off in full. 
Simultaneously, the trustees have been urged by a caucus of 
churches to sell all pension holdings of companies that have factories 
or branch offices in South Africa, that sell to companies with such 
factories or offices, or that sell to the government of South Africa. 
The resulting funds would be invested in other, listed companies. The 
holdings affected under this proposal currently generate an aggregate 
return of 10%. The companies in question constitute a large percent­
age of the firms listed on the New York and American stock ex­
changes. Outside investment counsel has indicated that, if the plan 
invests in the remaining firms on the two exchanges, it can expect a 
rate of return lower than 10%. 
A fourth and final example pertains to the public employees' pen­
sion plan of a small New England state. The managers of the plan 
® For an introduction to the federal insurance of pension plans, see the legislative reports 
accompanying The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, H.R. Rep. No. 533, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 935, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4639, 4652-54, 
4662-64, 5142-61, & 5171. 
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have been approached by local real estate interests to commit $5 mil­
lion for thirty-year, fixed-rate, low-interest mortgages. 
Under the proposal, funds from the state pension plan would be 
used for mortgages to first-time home buyers who purchase or build 
anywhere in the state. These mortgages would bear a permanent rate 
of 10%. That rate is 2% less than the plan could otherwise obtain 
and 3% less than the current rate for thirty-year, fixed-rate, low-inter­
est mortgages. 
The state does not levy an income tax. It does, however, levy a 
7% sales tax, which applies to the materials purchased for new home 
construction. The state also imposes a 7% real estate conveyance tax 
levied on the gross sales price of all real property sold within the 
boundaries of the state. The state's financial position, while not with­
out its problems, is essentially acceptable. 
The plan is of the defined contribution type.^° Each year, the 
state contributes for each employee participating in the plan an 
amount equal to 5% of the employee's salary in that year. Upon re­
tirement, the employee is entitled to the state's cumulative contribu­
tions on his behalf plus the cumulative earnings attributable to those 
contributions. 
II. LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENTS AND GLOBAL 
SOCIAL INVESTMENTS 
The proposals to our hypothetical university, corporation, 
church organization, and state pension plan typify what has come to 
be called the social investment. The concept of the social investment 
is one that has emerged relatively recently with the recognition that 
the assets of institutions, such as pension and profit-sharing plans, 
foundations, and university endowments, are of significant magni­
tude." Among the reasons for this growth is the favorable tax treat­
ment afforded to contributions to these institutions and to the 
institutions' earnings." 
If the growth of pension, university, and foundation assets was 
the factual predicate to the demand for social investing, the case for 
10 In a defined contribution plan, the amount of contribution to be made by the employer, 
rather than the level of benefits to be provided to the employee upon retirement, is specified in 
the plan. Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 8, at 935-36. 
11 On the size of these funds, see Assets Surge to $806 Billion, Pensions and Investment 
Age, Jan. 23, 1984, at 3; College Endowments Grow by Millions With Surge in Market, N.Y. 
Times, July 23, 1983, at A5, col. 2. 
12 I.R.C. §§ 170, 401(a), 404(a), 501(a). Section 170(a) allows a tax deduction for charita­
ble contributions. A charitable contribution is defined generally in § 170(c) as a contribution 
or gift to: 
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social investing still requires acceptance of a key normative premise; 
fiduciaries, in making investment decisions, may (or must) consider 
the political, economic, and social effects of those investments. 
Over the last decade or so, there has developed increasing inter­
est in deploying pension and endowment assets to further social 
goals.Universities have been pressured to divest their portfolios of 
the stock of corporations doing business in South Africa."^ State and 
1) A state, the United States, a possession of the United States, a political 
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia provided that the contribution is 
made for exclusively public purposes. 
2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation— 
A) created or organized in the United States, any state, the District of 
Columbia, or any possession of the United States; and 
B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, national or international amateur sport competi­
tion, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. 
3) other organizations listed in § 170(c)(3), (4), (5). 
Section 401(a) lists the requirements for qualification as a pension, profit-sharing, or stock 
bonus plan. 
Section 404(a) allows a tax deduction for contributions paid by an employer to an em­
ployee's stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or deferred-payment plan. 
Section 501(a) exempts certain organizations, specifically those described in §§ 401(a), 
501(c), and 501(d) from taxation. Section 501(c) includes, among other things, a corporation, 
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari­
table, scientific, public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster a national or inter­
national amateur sports organization, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children. 
The hypothetical university, corporation, state, and church described in this Article, see 
supra text accompanying notes 5-10, would all be afforded favorable tax treatment under the 
Code. 
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local government pension funds have been used to provide mortgages 
for homeowners within the governments' respective boundaries and to 
encourage economic development.'' Foundations have been asked to 
refrain from investing in corporations that work on Pentagon con­
tracts.'^ Unions have demanded that pension funds be invested only 
in unionized corporations.The list could go on. 
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These demands insist that the investment decisions of fiduciaries 
neither be limited to traditional economic criteria (e.g., What is the 
rate of return? Will the investment appreciate in the future?), nor be 
concerned only with the welfare of the designated beneficiary of the 
assets in question (e.g., the government employee, the university 
budget, the union's retiree). Instead, these demands require the fidu­
ciary to consider the impact of his investment decisions on society. 
The investment is to be social in the sense that the private interest of 
the fiduciary's beneficiary is not alone to control. The impact of the 
investment on others is to be considered as well. 
The concept of social investing would introduce into the fiduci­
ary relationship new parties and considerations. Traditionally, the fi­
duciary relationship has been viewed as a two-party affair involving 
one person (i.e., the trustee, the executor, the administrator) who 
holds and manages property for the benefit of a second (i.e., the trust 
beneficiary, the legatee, the heir). Consequently, the focus of conven­
tional fiduciary jurisprudence is the regulation of this bilateral 
relationship.'® 
The advocates of social investing would redefine the fiduciary re­
lationship as a three-party affair involving the fiduciary, the benefici­
ary, and society as a whole. 
It is here that I advance the distinction between a local social 
investment and a global social investment. For among the third party 
"others," whose welfare may be affected by the fiduciary's decisions, 
are the fiduciary's beneficiaries themselves. When municipal pension 
monies are used for low-interest mortgages, among those benefiting 
from such mortgages are the pension plan participants who live in the 
city and who take mortgages from the plan. If our hypothetical uni­
versity makes the requested loan to the proposed developer, one of the 
adjoining property owners whose real estate will benefit will be the 
university itself. 
A social investment that takes place in the fiduciary's backyard 
may yield some of its "social" advantage to the fiduciary's beneficiary. 
It is this type of investment that I would label the "local" social in­
vestment in contradistinction to the "global" social investment. 
Admittedly, the distinction is often one of degree: if the univer­
sity were asked to fund a project three miles from its campus and real 
estate holdings, the university would still derive some of the social 
Investing Plan Assets in Mortgages, 10 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 437, at 552, 552 (Mar. 28, 
1983); Financial Institutions Show Interest in Socially Responsive Investing, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1752, 1753 (Oct. 15, 1982). 
See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
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benefit, though perhaps not as much as it would derive from a project 
immediately adjacent to the campus. A project ten miles away might 
generate even less social benefit for the university. Although the dif­
ference is often one of degree rather than kind, the distinction be­
tween local and global social investments remains a useful one. 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING FIDUCIARY 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS: A BRIEF REVIEW 
Historically, the supervision of fiduciaries was a task performed 
by the courts of equity. Consequently, our oldest sources of fiduciary 
jurisprudence are the case law criteria that outline the traditional re­
sponsibilities of trustees and executors.'^ 
Because of the possibilities for abuse inherent in the fiduciary's 
position, the courts of equity protected the interests of the beneficiary 
by imposing certain affirmative duties on the fiduciary and proscribing 
other actions inimical to the welfare of the beneficiary.^® Even today, 
the executor of an estate or the trustee of a private trust remains the 
classic fiduciary, holding and managing property for the benefit of 
someone other than himself. 
The courts of equity performed two major tasks when they de­
fined the obligations of the fiduciary. First, they postulated that the 
fiduciary's prime responsibility is to his beneficiary. The fiduciary 
must avoid even the appearance of violating that responsibility and 
must avoid enriching himself at his beneficiary's expense.^' Second, 
the courts indicated that the fiduciary must protect the assets under 
his control through prudent investment decisions that result in the 
diversification of those assets and that achieve a reasonable rate of 
For the classic common law case, see Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 
(1830). 
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself 
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, 
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, 
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable 
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 
Id. at 461. The responsibilities of the modem trustee are most often described in the tmst 
instrument. In the absence of such explicit delineation, those responsbilities are generally com­
prised of the duty of loyalty and the duty not to delegate, to keep and render accounts, and to 
exercise reasonable skill and care in the adminstration of the trust. 2 A. Scott, The Law of 
Trusts § 164, at 1254-55 (3d ed. 1967). 
20 For example, in the absence of express provisions in the trust instrument, courts of eq­
uity have imposed certain duties, such as the duty of loyalty, while proscribing certain activi­
ties such as selling land, chattels, and securities, or borrowing money from the trust. 2 A. 
Scott, supra note 19, § 164, at 1254, 1256. 
21 G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 541, at 157 (rev. 2d ed. 
1977). 
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return. The fiduciary is to diversify and make productive the assets 
under his control because that is how the prudent man manages his 
own investments.^^ The fiduciary's beneficiaries are entitled to noth­
ing less. 
Hence, a trustee who receives trust property consisting solely of 
cash must, absent special permission from the grantor, diversify his 
holdings into other types of investments. He cannot keep excessive 
amounts of monies in noninterest bearing accounts, since the benefi­
ciaries are entitled to have the assets of the trust invested in a produc­
tive manner.^^ Indeed, an executor will have dilSculty justifying the 
retention of cash balances in low-interest accounts for an unreasona­
ble period of time.^'* 
In the twentieth century, the courts have extended the traditional 
rules of fiduciary law to nontraditional fiduciaries, for example, to the 
trustees of private foundations and universities.^' 
The decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding 
the Duke Endowment are the leading cases involving the charitable 
trustee's duty to diversify and maximize trust assets.^® They also 
highlight the increasing federalization of fiduciary regulation through 
the Internal Revenue Code and other federal statutes. Somewhat 
ironically, these decisions arose not from a situation in which the 
trustees failed to diversify or seek a high rate of return, but from one 
in which the grantor of the charitable trust forbade them to do so. 
In 1924, James B. Duke created a charitable trust known as the 
Duke Endowment. In the indenture creating the endowment, Duke 
22 Id. § 612, at 18-20. 
23 2 A. Scott, supra note 19, § 181, at 1463. 
24 Id. § 180.3, at 1457. 
25 See G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, supra note 21, § 391, at 206-07; e.g.. Rand v. McKit-
trick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940) (trustees of private hospital held to traditional stan­
dard of fiduciary care). For a recent application of the traditional fiduciary law in the context 
of a pension plan, see Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978), afFd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). In Withers, the trustees of a New York City 
municipal pension plan invested pension funds in "highly speculative" New York City bonds. 
Some beneficiaries of the plan contended that the trustees violated their fiduciary duty by 
purchasing the bonds and by investing with the objective of rescuing the city from bankruptcy 
instead of enhancing the fund. In holding that the trustee's decision to invest in New York 
City bonds was prudent in light of the fact that the city was the major contributor and guaran­
tor of the funds, the court reiterated the traditional responsibility of fiduciaries to exercise 
prudence in the care of the funds entrusted to them: "The classic statement of the 'prudent 
man rule' in New York is that 'the trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such pru­
dence in the care and management [of the fund], as, in general, prudent men of discretion and 
intelligence in such matters, employ in their own affairs.' " Id. at 1254 (quoting King v. Tal­
bot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85-86 (1869)). 
26 See Davison v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973); Cocke v. Duke Univ., 
260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963). 
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designated Duke University and a variety of eleemosynary institutions 
in North and South Carolina as the recipients of the trust's income. 
Duke further provided that the trustees were generally to invest the 
endowment's assets in the securities of, or loans to, the Duke Power 
Company or one of its subsidiaries. Under limited circumstances, the 
trustees could invest assets in specified types of government bonds. 
Other types of investments were generally forbidden.^' 
By 1961, the trust owned stocks and bonds of the Duke Power 
Company worth $393,695,928. The trustees owned 57% of the voting 
stock of the Duke Power Company. Seven of the sixteen directors of 
the Duke Power Company were trustees of the endowment. These 
stocks and bonds constituted, by value, over 80% of the endowment's 
assets.^® 
The trustees, concerned about the undiversified nature of the 
trust's portfolio, petitioned the North Carolina courts to amend the 
trust indenture to permit investments in stocks and bonds other than 
those of the Duke Power Company and its subsidiaries. The lower 
court, impressed by the testimony of "investment experts" that "a 
greater degree of diversification is necessary, under general trust in­
vestment principles," acceded to the trustees' request and modified 
the indenture to provide for a broad range of investments. The court 
concluded that the situation in which the trust found itself constituted 
an "emergency" justifying the judicial modification of the trust 
indenture.^' 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed. It may ordina­
rily be, the court noted, "that a prudent person does not carry all his 
eggs in one basket."^® James B. Duke, however, was no ordinary per­
son. The creator of the American Tobacco Corporation, Duke was a 
giant of industry on a par with John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Car­
negie. The provisions of the trust indenture were carefully and delib­
erately developed by Duke and his attorney. The Supreme Court 
would not interfere with Duke's considered decision to restrict the 
trustees to an undiversified portfolio. The lower court was reversed.^' 
The saga, however, did not end there. 
After the Tax Reform Act of 1969^^ added section 4943 to the 
Internal Revenue Code, the trustees were confronted with the neces-
27 Cocke V. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 6, 131 S.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1963). 
28 Id. at 13, 131 S.E.2d at 916. 
29 Id. at 14, 131 S.E.2d at 917. 
30 Id. at 20, 131 S.E.2d at 921. 
31 Id. at 22, 131 S.E.2d at 922. 
32 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 509, 
532-37. 
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sity of divesting themselves of some of the endowment's Duke Power 
stock or paying penalty taxes for excess business holdings.^^ Section 
4943 generally forbids private foundations from holding controlling 
interests in corporations and businesses.^"^ The adoption of section 
4943 thus forced the trustees to sell some of their Duke Power stock. 
The indenture required the trustees to invest the proceeds of that 
stock in government obligations. Constrained by these restrictions, 
the trustees argued that the trust's already poor investment perform­
ance would deteriorate further.^' 
This time the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the 
trustees and authorized them to invest trust assets in a wide range of 
stocks and bonds. The passage of section 4943 was viewed by the 
court as enough of an emergency to override James Duke's restric­
tions on the trustees' investment powers.^® 
The Duke Endowment cases reflect the historic framework gov­
erning charitable fiduciaries. The authorities relied upon by the 
North Carolina courts were the case law decisions defining the rules 
pertaining to private trusts. These cases impose a basic duty to diver­
sify and make productive the assets held by charitable fiduciaries. 
The charitable trustee, like the private trustee, must treat the funds 
confided to him as the prudent man would treat his personal 
resources. 
The fiduciary obligations established by the courts have, in many 
situations, been statutorily reinforced and elaborated upon by Con­
gress. Congress grants exemptions from and deductions for federal 
tax purposes, in order to encourage certain types of institutions Con­
gress deems worthy of financial support.^"' In effect, the federal fisc 
subsidizes these institutions by declining to tax their income and by 
reducing the tax of those who contribute to these institutions.^® To 
ensure that federal support of eleemosynary institutions achieves its 
I.R.C. § 4943; see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
34 I.R.C, § 4943(c); see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
35 Davison v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d 761 (1973). 
36 Id. at 694-95, 194 S.E.2d at 772-73. 
3'7 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
38 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983); 
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is ad­
ministered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a 
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its 
income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a 
portion of the individual's contributions. The system Congress has enacted pro­
vides this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an 
additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in substan­
tial lobbying. 
Id. at 2000 (footnote omitted). 
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intended objectives, Congress has imposed responsibilities upon the 
fiduciaries who control these institutions. Not surprisingly, these fi­
duciary duties bear a close resemblance to the traditional obligations 
of loyalty, productivity, and diversification outlined by the courts of 
equity. 
Particularly strict is the regulation, by Congress, of the fiducia­
ries of private foundations. Under Code section 4941, such fiduciaries 
are generally forbidden to sell or lease property to their foundations; 
to exchange property with their foundations; to borrow from, or lend 
to, their foundations; to provide goods, services or facilities to their 
foundations; or to otherwise use or benefit from the foundations' as­
sets. Congress' rationale for these proscriptions was that fiduciaries 
should not be permitted to benefit from their foundations. An abso­
lute prohibition on dealings between foundations and fiduciaries is the 
only effective means of policing fiduciary behavior.'^ A fiduciary who 
violates the proscriptions of section 4941 is subject to a personal pen­
alty tax.'^' 
Imprudent investments by private foundation fiduciaries are sim­
ilarly prohibited by Congress. Under section 4944, the fiduciary who 
knowingly participates in such an investment is subject to personal 
liability.'^^ 
Section 4943, at issue in the second of the Duke Endowment de­
cisions, imposes a specific type of diversification requirement upon 
private foundations. Under section 4943, a private foundation gener­
ally may not own more than 20% of the voting interest in any busi­
ness.'*^ Under certain circumstances, the Treasury may permit 
ownership of up to 35% of the voting interest of a business.'*^ Foun­
dations that hold assets in excess of these limits are subject to penalty 
taxes.'*^ While the foundation's fiduciaries are not subject to personal 
39 I,R.C. § 4941. 
'•o For a discussion of the history and origin of Section 4941, see Zelinsky, Section 4975 and 
PTE 77-9: The Causes of Complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, 15 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1, 7-19 
(1981). 
I.R.C. § 4941(a), (b). "Section 4941 provides for an initial penalty as a result of the 
prohibited transaction itself. If the transaction is not remedied within a specified 'correction 
period,' an additional, heavier tax is placed upon the culpable disqualified person." Zelinsky, 
supra note 40, at 17. 
42 I,R.C. § 4944(a)(2). 
43 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A). 
44 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B). 
45 Section 4943 imposes a tax equal to 5% of the value of excess business holdings of any 
private foundation during the taxable year. Id. § 4943(a)(1). Where an initial tax is imposed 
under subsection (a), and at the close of the taxable period the foundation still has excess 
business holdings in that enterprise, there is an additional tax equal to 200% of the value of the 
excess holdings. Id. § 4943(b). 
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liability under section 4943, that provision nevertheless constrains 
their behavior since any penalty taxes paid by the foundation would, 
as a matter of state law, reflect on the fiduciaries' handling of the 
foundation's affairs."*® 
Just as Congress viewed private foundations as tax-subsidized in­
stitutions whose fiduciaries are appropriately subject to federal regula­
tion, Congress has imposed statutory restrictions on the fiduciaries of 
profit-sharing and pension plans. Section 4975, modeled after section 
4941, generally prohibits the fiduciaries of pension and profit-sharing 
plans from selling or leasing property to their plans; from exchanging 
with their plans; from engaging in loan transactions with their plans; 
from furnishing to, or receiving from, their plans goods, services, and 
facilities; and from using, or benefiting from, the assets of their 
plans."*' Fiduciaries who engage in these prohibited transactions are 
subject to personal penalty taxes."*® 
The Internal Revenue Code further conditions the tax-exempt 
status of pension and profit-sharing plans upon the use of plan assets 
for "the exclusive benefit" of plan participants and beneficiaries."*' As 
we shall see below, the exclusive benefit rule has in practice served as 
a restraint on the misuse of plan assets by fiduciaries and has been 
interpreted as embodying the prudent man requirements of productiv­
ity and diversity.^® 
Indeed, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
("ERISA")'* effected the wholesale federalization of the fiduciary ob­
ligations of pension and profit-sharing trustees. In addition to section 
4975, ERISA imposed upon all such trustees a federally enforceable 
obligation to invest pension and profit-sharing assets in a prudent and 
productive manner." ERISA further imposed on plan trustees an ex­
plicit duty to diversify plan assets." Violation of these statutory re­
straints may be challenged judicially by the Department of Labor or 
On the practical effects of § 4943, see Foundation Sells 19 Buildings For $400 Million in 
Divestiture, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1984, at D23, col. 1; Chicago Philanthropy Balks at Sale of 
Assets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1983, at Bll, col. 2. 
47 I.R.C. § 4975. 
48 Id. § 4975(a), (b). "Section 4975 replicates the two tier tax scheme of section 4941, 
imposing a first tier tax on the prohibited transaction and a second tier tax if the transaction is 
not corrected after the exercise of judicial and appellate review." Zelinsky, supra note 40, at 
23. 
49 I.R.C. § 401(a)(2). See supra note 12. 
50 See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
51 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 935 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982)). 
52 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). 
53 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
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by plan participants and beneficiaries.''^ A fiduciary found to have 
violated his ERISA obligation to invest prudently and diversely may 
be removed from his position and may be required to make restitution 
for his breach of duty." 
In Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,^^ the Secretary of Labor 
and the participants of a pension plan challenged the investment prac­
tices of the plan's fiduciaries as violative of the ERISA-imposed duty 
to diversify and invest prudently. The defendant fiduciaries, rather 
than placing plan assets in stocks, bonds, or similar properties, had 
loaned "virtually all of the [pjlan's assets" back to the companies 
sponsoring the plan.'^ In return, the fiduciaries took unsecured prom­
issory notes from those companies. Hence, the plan's portfolio con­
sisted almost exclusively of notes from the sponsoring employers.'® 
The district court, not surprisingly, characterized this practice as 
a "complete failure to diversify'"^ and ordered the removal of the de­
fendant fiduciaries and the appointment of a new trustee.^ 
A somewhat more subtle situation was at issue in Marshall v. 
Glass/Metal Association & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan,^^ 
which also arose under the ERISA fiduciary statutes. There, the Sec­
retary of Labor sought to enjoin, on diversification and prudence 
grounds, a loan by a pension plan before the loan was consummated. 
The trustees proposed to lend 23% of the plan's assets to a company 
intending to develop a time-sharing vacation project to be marketed 
to local residents. The project had already been suspended once for 
financial and economic reasons. Moreover, the court found that the 
"marketing concept" animating the project "was completely un­
tried."" In light of these "special risks," the court concluded that the 
proposed loan, if actually made, would violate the trustees' obligation 
to diversify. Accordingly, the court enjoined the trustees from mak­
ing the loan.®' 
Similarly, in Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust 
Fund,^ the court, at the instigation of the Secretary of Labor, en­
joined pension trustees from making a contemplated loan to finance a 
54 Id. § 1132(a). 
55 Id. § 1109(a). 
56 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
57 Id. at 636. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 644. 
61 507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980). 
62 Id. at 382. 
63 Id. at 384-85. 
64 458 F. Supp. 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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hotel and casino in Las Vegas. Finding that the proposed loan would 
have utilized 36% of the plan's funds, the court characterized the 
loan as "a disproportionate commitment" of the plan's assets and 
therefore a violation of the trustees' duty to diversify.^' 
The specific details of Freund, Glass/Metal, and Teamsters Local 
282 are of less importance than the explicit federalization of the duty 
to diversify and invest prudently which they represent. However, 
even prior to the adoption of ERISA, the IRS took the position that 
the exclusive benefit rule of the Internal Revenue Code imposes upon 
pension and profit-sharing trustees the duty to diversify the assets 
under their control and to make those assets productive. In Revenue 
Ruling 69-494,®^ the IRS stated that an investment by a pension plan 
is consistent with the exclusive benefit rule only if, in addition to 
meeting other requirements, the investment results in a reasonable 
rate of return and the "diversity that a prudent investor" would insist 
upon. Subsequently, in Revenue Ruling 73-380,^' the IRS held that a 
loan by a plan of "substantially all" of its assets to the sponsoring 
employer violated the exclusive benefit rule because of the conse­
quently undiversified nature of the plan's portfolio.^® 
The IRS' interpretation of the exclusive benefit rule was em­
braced by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Central Mo­
tor Co. V. United States.^^ In Central Motor, the employer corporation 
(Central Motor) was controlled by one Mr. Gurley. Substantially all 
of the assets of the Central Motor pension plan were loaned to a sec­
ond company. Credit Investment. Credit Investment was controlled 
by Mr. Gurley, his son, and his son-in-law.™ 
On these facts, the court, accepting the teaching of Revenue Rul­
ing 69-494, agreed that the plan violated the exclusive benefit rule 
because of its failure to diversify.^' 
For the purposes of this Article, one major conclusion emerges 
from this brief review. In all four of our examples—the university, 
the state's pension plan, the church organization's pension plan, and 
the construction company's profit-sharing plan—the fiduciaries are le­
gally bound to invest prudently, productively, and diversely. For 
some of these fiduciaries, the exclusive or primary sources of their 
obligations are federal statutes. For other fiduciaries, their duties 
65 Id. at 992. 
66 1969-2 C.B. 88. 
67 1973-2 C.B. 124. 
68 Id. at 124-25. 
69 583 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1978). 
70 Id. at 490. 
71 Id. at 490-91. 
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emerge from a mixture of federal and state authorities. In substance, 
however, all confront essentially the same obligation to invest produc­
tively and diversely. 
IV. THE CONCEPT OF THE EXTERNALITY 
As Professor Fellner has indicated, externalities are said to arise 
"when the production of a good or service creates benefits elsewhere 
in the economy, benefits which are external to the buyer-seller rela­
tions accompanying the act of production. Just as the notions of 
prudence, productivity, and diversification play a central role in fidu­
ciary law, the concept of the externality is critical to contemporary 
microeconomic theory.^^ 
For the theorists of the market, the existence of externalities cre­
ates a problem. In the absence of externalities, a free market will, in 
conception at least, result in the maximization of the economic wel­
fare of those participating in the market.^"* X will consume apples to 
the point where the cost of producing apples is justified by the in­
crease the apples make upon X's sense of well-being. In the language 
of contemporary microeconomics, X will consume apples until his 
marginal utility from apples equals the price at which he must buy 
them. X, of course, knows that point better than anyone else and 
should, therefore, be allowed to move to it on his own and without 
interference from others. Hence, X should be free to consume as 
many (or as few) apples as he wants.^^ 
Suppose, however, we are not dealing with goods like apples, 
which, when consumed, do not benefit X's neighbor, Y. Suppose in­
stead we are discussing a good that, when consumed by X, affects Y— 
e.g., the painting of the outside of X's house. X, if left to his own 
devices, will improve the outside of his house to the point where the 
•72 w. Fellner, Emergence and Content of Modem Economic Analysis 117 (1960). 
See, e.g., id. at 116. 
This maximization of resources is derived from the concept of pareto-optimality. A 
pareto-optimum situation is said to exist when "it is not possible to reallocate resources so as 
to improve the well-being (or utility) of one person without making at least one other person 
worse off (i.e., reduce their utility)." R. Roadway, Public Sector Economics 5 (1979). In a 
perfectly competitive economy, the free market will "lead to an efficient or [p]areto-optimal 
allocation of resources." Id. at 29. 
In the real world, however, the conditions necessary for efficient markets will rarely, if 
ever, exist. The market mechanism will fail to allocate resources efficiently due to the existence 
of factors such as externalities, see infra note 76 and accompanying text, public goods, increas­
ing returns to scale, risk and uncertainty, and tax distortions. See R. Roadway, supra, at 
29-40. 
'5 For what some would consider the classic contemporary statement of this view, see G. 
Stigler, The Theory of Price (3d ed. 1966). 
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cost of improvement is justified by X's sense of the resulting increase 
in his welfare. However, the improvement of the exterior of X's 
house gives rise to externalities that benefit X's neighbor, Y. The 
value of Y's house increases with the upgrading of X's adjoining prop­
erty. To put it another way, when X improves his property, he cre­
ates secondary benefits for Y. 
However, X will generally not be concerned with Y's welfare. 
Though additional improvements to X's house are beneficial for Y, X 
has no financial incentive to proceed with these improvements. In 
theory, Y can reimburse X for the cost of improving X's house and, 
indeed, Y will have a financial incentive to do so. The externalities 
that benefit Y justify the expenditure by Y of some funds to secure 
those benefits.^^ 
What happens, however, when X is surrounded by ten other 
homeowners in addition to Y? The bilateral reimbursement of X by 
Y becomes an inadequate response to the situation. Y will expect the 
other neighbors to pay for the externalities from which they benefit. 
Negotiations between so many property owners are likely to be time 
consuming and, possibly, unproductive. Hence, governmental inter­
vention (e.g., housing codes, subsidies, tax abatements) may be neces­
sary to motivate X to make investments in his house that will impact 
favorably on Y and the other neighbors.'^ 
An externality exists where the actions of one party affect the utility or production pos­
sibilities of another without being priced. "The fact that it is not priced implies that the 'emit­
ting' party has no incentive to take into consideration the effect, beneficial or detrimental, on 
the 'affected' party. That being the case, the emitting party may devote an inefficient amount 
of resources to pursuing the activity." R. Boadway, supra note 74, at 91. In order to arrive at 
pareto-optimality, the emitting party must consider not only the benefit that he will derive 
from the activity, but also the benefit (or detriment) that will be incurred by the affected party. 
Thus, a voluntary reimbursement will "internalize" the externality, and a pareto-optimal allo­
cation of resources will be achieved. 
Theoretically, X and Y can bargain with each other until the desired level of output is 
achieved. Y will have the incentive to reimburse X in order to maximize his own utility. See 
supra note 76 and accompanying text. However, excessive transaction costs may preclude the 
parties from reaching agreement on an optimal allocation of resources. R. Bish & H. Nourse, 
Urban Economics and Policy Analysis 114 & n.5 (1975). Similarly, with a large number of 
property owners, the voluntary compensation of X becomes more complicated. It may be 
impossible, or at the least very costly, to prevent the adjoining property owners from reaping 
the benefit of X's activity. Since a voluntary price may not be enforceable, the adjoining prop­
erty owners will have an incentive to consume the activity free of charge. This failure of the 
free market system is commonly known as the free rider problem. R. Boadway, supra note 74, 
at 31. 
The failure of the market to allocate resources efficiently has been presented as a justifica­
tion for governmental intervention. R. Bish & H. Nourse, supra, at 115; R. Boadway, supra 
note 74, at 31. Since a voluntary price mechanism may be unsuccessful in achieving pareto-
optimality, some kind of coercive device must be implemented in order to provide the parties 
with the incentive to take into account the external effects of the activity. Taxation, subsidies. 
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The example of X and Y as adjacent homeowners suggests why 
the concept of the externality has not played an important role in 
traditional fiduciary law. X and Y generate externalities because of 
their proximity to one another. Such proximity is obviously a func­
tion of urbanization. If X's house is a rural farmhouse, surrounded by 
acres of com, the painting of X's house will generate externalities for 
no one. Since much of our fiduciary law traces its roots to 
preurbanized days, the externalities, so obvious in a modern age, were 
generally absent when that law was in its formative stages."'® 
Nevertheless, the fiduciary's obligation to make the assets con­
fided to him productive should be defined as an obligation to make 
productive those assets accounting for all externalities affecting the 
fiduciary's beneficiary. The reason for formulating the fiduciary's du­
ties in this fashion is straightforward. The fiduciary's obligations are 
designed to emulate the prudent investor in the handling of his per­
sonal affairs."'' Even if the prudent investor has never heard the term 
"externalities," he knows they exist and he accounts for them in his 
investment decisions. What prudent owner of urban or suburban real 
estate does not recognize and concern himself with the condition of 
adjoining parcels? As the goal of fiduciary law is to require fiduciaries 
to behave like prudent men, fiduciaries should explicitly be required 
to recognize the existence of externalities. 
V. THE LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN CONTEXT: A CLOSER 
LOOK AT FOUR EXAMPLES 
Against this background, we can examine the proposals ad­
vanced to our hypothetical university and to our pension and profit-
sharing plans. This examination will confirm my central observation 
that, because of its externalities, the local social investment will often 
be highly productive. However, because of its local nature, it will 
generally be among the least diversifying investments available to the 
fiduciary. Hence, one traditional criterion of fiduciary law (rate of 
return) will frequently impel the making of the local social investment 
while another criterion (diversification) will often forbid it. 
The benefits of the city's proposal to the university are, at first 
blush, clear. In addition to the direct cash return from the proposed 
mortgage, the university's downtown real estate holdings should in­
crease in value as a result of the projected redevelopment activity. As 
and allocation of property rights are examples of government practices that attempt to correct 
market failure. Id. at 111-20. 
•'s See, e.g., Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). 
See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
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the university owns a significant portion of downtown real estate, its 
holdings will receive a substantial part of the externalities generated 
by the redevelopment activity. We can, therefore, say with reasonable 
confidence that the rate of return on the proposed mortgage will be in 
excess of 8% once we acknowledge the benefits of this investment to 
the university's downtown holdings. 
Indeed, we can reasonably conclude that the rate of return on 
this ostensibly social investment may eventually equal or surpass that 
of more conventional opportunities available to the university. The 
difference in direct return between the proposed mortgage and alter­
native investments is $200,000 per year—the 2% difference between 
an 8% return on $10 million and a 10% return on that same amount. 
If we modestly assume that the university's downtown holdings will 
appreciate on an annual basis by an extra 0.4% as a result of the 
proposed project, then the extra appreciation of $200,000 per year 
equalizes the rate of return of the proposed mortgage with the return 
on more conventional investments.®" Indeed, if we assume that the 
extra appreciation of the university's holdings will constitute 0.5% 
per year, the rate of return on the social investment will actually ex­
ceed that on more conventional assets.®' 
This analysis only focuses upon the externalities to be derived by 
the university's investment holdings in the downtown area. The uni­
versity, however, owns a second type of real estate that will benefit 
from the proposed project. The campus, or more precisely the por­
tion that adjoins downtown, will also benefit from the improvement of 
the downtown area. The campus may be viewed by the university as 
an economic asset, potentially saleable or available to collateralize 
loans to the university. If so, the rate of return on the proposed mort­
gage, adjusted to reflect the additional externalities upon the univer­
sity's campus real estate, may go even higher. 
Hence, if we look only at the rate of return, the proposed social 
investment is potentially attractive for the university whether or not 
the university wants to help the city. The university's own interests, if 
defined as the rate of return, are potentially sufficient to impel the 
university to extend the proposed mortgage. 
However, while the proposed mortgage may be a good invest­
ment in terms of its rate of return, it is difficult to imagine a less di-
It was hypothesized that the university has holdings in downtown Westville that are 
worth $50 million. See supra text accompanying note 5. An extra 0.4% of annual apprecia­
tion on $50 million is $200,000. 
Extra annual appreciation of 0.5% on the university's $50 million holdings in downtown 
Westville would amount to $250,000 per year. This more than compensates for the $200,000 
the university will forego by extending the lower interest mortgage. 
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verse investment for the university. The university's economic 
fortunes are already heavily tied to those of Westville. Of the univer­
sity's endowment dollars, one in six is already invested in downtown 
Westville and the university's campus represents an additional $100 
million investment in the town. Thus, over 37% of the university's 
wealth is tied up with the fate of Westville.®^ The proposed mortgage 
would further entwine the university's financial fortunes with those of 
Westville. From the viewpoint of diversification, the proposed mort­
gage is a bad deployment of the university's resources. 
It is useful to contrast the mortgage proposed to the university by 
the city with the demand that the university divest itself of military-
related stocks. That demand, if acceded to by the university, would 
reduce the range of investments available to the university. However, 
even if the university divested itself of the stocks of all companies that 
derive substantial income from military sales, it could still select from 
many issues listed on the New York and American exchanges. The 
university would still be able to invest in blue chip and growth stocks. 
While the university's discretion to purchase stocks would be nar­
rowed, it could still maintain a fairly diversified portfolio. 
On the other hand, a military-sensitive investment policy would 
not generate any secondary economic benefits like the externalities of 
the mortgage proposal for the university's real estate. If the move­
ment of assets from military-based industries to nonmilitary invest­
ments will lower the cash rate of return (and the university's advisors 
think that it might), the university will indeed suffer economically as a 
result of the decision to divest military-based stocks. 
In short, though both the mortgage proposal and the demand to 
divest military stocks are commonly styled social investments, they 
pose significantly different choices for the university in terms of diver­
sification and rate of return. 
The dilemma of the local social investment reappears when we 
examine the proposal to the profit-sharing trustees of the home con­
struction company. If implemented, the proposal to invest profit-
sharing assets in low-rate mortgages will generate two externalities for 
the plan and its participants: additional mortgage money will mean 
more home construction and thus more work for plan participants. 
More home construction in Elmtown should also increase corporate 
profits and thus increase contributions to the corporation's profit-
sharing plan. 
82 The university's assets total $400 million; its $100 million campus and its $300 million 
endowment. The campus and the university's downtown holdings represent $150 million of 
this $400 million, or 37.5% of the total. 
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Looking at the rate of return, it is not difficult to conclude that 
plan participants may be better off if the proposal to the trustees for 
home mortgage loans is accepted. Let us assume, for example, that 
the typical participant has a balance of $10,000 in the plan. Hence, 
$1,000 of his profit-sharing funds will be invested in the mortgage pro­
gram at a return 2% less than the return otherwise obtainable.^^ The 
local social investment initially "costs" this participant $20, repre­
senting the first year's lower return on $1,000 of his profit-sharing 
funds. Over the course of three years, the local social investment re­
sults in a direct cash return $60 less than the participant would other­
wise receive.®'* 
However, if the mortgage program is successful, the corporation 
will contribute additional funds to his profit-sharing account. If this 
additional contribution comes to $60, the participant's account will be 
fully restored to the level it would have attained at market rates. If 
the additional contribution to the participant's account exceeds $60, 
the participant has, paradoxically, made money through the low-rate 
investment. 
Moreover, these calculations ignore what the participants may 
consider the most important externality: work or, more precisely, the 
additional income each participant will receive as a result of the addi­
tional work generated for him by the mortgage program. 
However, the trustees must confront the question of diversifica­
tion. Here again we see the problem of the local social investment. 
The financial fates of the plan and of its participants are already en­
twined with the economy of Elmtown in general, and Elmtown's 
housing market in particular. Making the plan a mortgagee of 
Elmtown real estate further ties the fortunes of the plan to those of 
Elmtown. The absence of diversification would become particularly 
acute if the plan, as mortgagee, were forced to foreclose on any of the 
homes it had financed. The plan, in attempting to sell these existing 
homes, could find itself competing with the corporation and its efforts 
to encourage new housing construction. 
The solar-based investment urged upon the trustees by local envi­
ronmental groups also entails certain disadvantages. The securities of 
any new company must be considered risky. When the company's 
product is of an experimental nature, the risks must be considered 
even greater. Whatever the propects for long-term growth in the so­
lar-equipment industry, it is unlikely that the securities proposed to 
The funds to be invested in low-rate mortgages represent one-tenth of the plan's current 
assets. See text accompanying note 6. 
8^ That is, the participant will earn 2% less on $1,000, i.e., $20, for three years. 
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the trustees will generate significant returns in the company's early 
years. 
Nevertheless, the environmentalists' proposal has one great ad­
vantage over the mortgage plan: the environmentalists' investment 
would diversify the trustees out of the homebuilding market and the 
Elmtown market in particular. As we have seen, the mortgage propo­
sal would subject the profit-sharing plan to a form of economic double 
jeopardy. Corporate profits and thus profit-sharing contributions are 
already at the mercy of the Elmtown housing market. The mortgage 
proposal would further tie the plan's economic fate to Elmtown hous­
ing by making the plan a mortgagee of part of that housing. 
In contrast, the corporation advocated by the environmentalists 
will make solar equipment for use in sections of the country other 
than Elmtown. Moreover, that equipment is industrial rather than 
residential in nature. Whatever the overall merits of the two social 
investments advanced to our hypothetical profit-sharing trustees, the 
mortgage proposal is clearly inferior to the solar proposal from the 
viewpoint of diversification. 
At first blush, it appears that the participants in the church or­
ganization's defined benefit pension plan would be indifferent to the 
social investment proposals advanced to the plan's trustees. Because 
the plan is of the defined benefit variety, each participant is guaran­
teed a specific retirement benefit. If the plan's investment perform­
ance is inadequate to provide the promised benefit, the employer 
organization must make up the difference from its own funds.®' 
Moreover, the insurance provided by the PBGC guarantees a feder­
ally determined level of pension benefits for each participant.®^ Con­
sequently, plan participants probably would not care how the trustees 
invest the funds confided to them. 
On further reflection, however, the matter is not so clear. The 
PBGC currently insures only about $15,000 of each participant's an­
nual pension benefit.®"' While this figure will rise with the cost of liv­
ing, a portion of retirement benefits for higher paid employees may 
never be guaranteed by the PBGC. For example, the plan promises a 
senior employee currently making a salary of $80,000 per year an an­
nual retirement pension of $48,000.®® Less than half of this benefit 
85 See supra note 8. 
86 See supra note 9. 
8'7 See PBGC News Release, 4 Pens. & Profit Sharing (P-H) H 135,520 (Dec. 10, 1980) (the 
maximum pension guaranteed for plans that terminated in 1981 was $1,261.36 per month; 
however, the average monthly benefit paid was substantially less). 
88 The participant's projected benefit is 60% of his final salary, which now looks like 
$80,000. 
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would be insured by the PBGC in the case of employer default. 
Moreover, the prospects of employer default cannot be dismissed 
lightly. A plan participant currently in his early thirties must wait 
approximately three decades to receive his pension benefit. It is al­
most impossible for him to predict with any confidence what the or­
ganization's financial capacity will be at the time of his retirement. It 
is quite possible that the employer's commitment to make good on the 
promised benefit may not be worth much thirty years from now.®' 
The nature of the employer ought to engender some concern on 
the part of the plan participant. He is, after all, not working for a blue 
chip industrial giant but for a voluntary, nonprofit organization, 
which, in the past, has seen significant fluctuations in membership 
and income. The employer's guarantee of the participant's projected 
benefit necessarily relies on the organization's ability to attract and 
retain dues-paying churches. 
The plan participant should be concerned about the employer's 
financial position in one other respect. Lower investment returns by 
the trustees will increase both the immediate and long-term liability of 
the employer to make up the difference between the funds in the plan 
and the funds needed to provide the plan's promised benefits. If the 
organization's actual or potential liability under the pension plan be­
comes too great, it might respond by either terminating the plan, or 
by freezing current salaries and thus freezing plan benefits. Either 
alternative, of course, would have an adverse impact upon plan 
participants. 
In short, the plan participants, particularly those with benefits 
projected in excess of the level guaranteed by the PBGC, have a sig­
nificant interest in the employer's financial condition and the trustees' 
investment performance. The proposal to extend below market rate 
mortgages to churches in poor areas should be evaluated in that light. 
In view of the organization's history, the mortgage proposal may 
be a desirable one for the plan's participants. The externality here— 
the churches' commitment to affiliate and pay dues for the ten years— 
strengthens the value of the organization's guarantee of the benefit 
promised by the plan. As we saw, that guarantee is no better than the 
organization's own financial strength. By bolstering the income of the 
church organization for a ten-year period, the mortgage proposal en-
89 The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 
Stat. 1208, was, in large measure, a response to the PBGC's meager resources relative to the 
enormous unfunded pension liabilities which exist in multiemployer plans. See H.R. Rep. No. 
869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-57, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2918, 
2920-25. 
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hances the probability that the promised benefit will be paid if the 
organization must provide the benefit out of its own funds. 
However, serious questions must be asked about the mortgage 
proposal under the heading of diversification. The financial well-be­
ing of the plan participants is already closely tied to the economic 
welfare of the churches affiliated with the organization. If those 
churches experience a decline in membership or financial hardship 
that impedes the regular payment of dues, the organization's income 
will suffer, with evident consequences for the employees, their sala­
ries, and the organization's ability to pay pension contributions. The 
proposal to extend mortgages to affiliated churches compounds the 
participants' vulnerability to the churches' fortunes. If the mort­
gagor-churches experience difficult times, not only will they have 
trouble making significant payments to the organization, but in all 
likelihood they will have trouble paying their mortgages as well. Plan 
participants could thus lose doubly from declines in the fortunes of 
the participating churches, once because of reduced membership in­
come, and a second time because of mortgage default. 
Moreover, if mortgage default reflects the further economic dete­
rioration of the areas in which the mortgagor churches are located, 
the plan's position may be seriously imperiled. Compelled to fore­
close, the plan could find that those church buildings are of little re­
sale value. 
We can contrast the mortgage proposal to the church organiza­
tion's trustees with the suggestion that the trustees divest stocks in 
companies conducting business directly or indirectly with South Af­
rica and then reinvest the proceeds in companies without such con­
tacts. The latter proposal will not generate any externalities for the 
plan: there are no secondary economic benefits from the proposed di­
vestiture and reinvestment in firms that do not do business in South 
Africa. 
However, the anti-apartheid proposal results in greater diversifi­
cation for the plan and its participants than does the proposal to ex­
tend mortgages to churches in low income areas. The fate of the plan 
is tied substantially to the ability of these churches, which pay dues to 
the national organization, to attract and retain members. The mort­
gage proposal would further entwine the interests of the plan and its 
participants with the fortunes of these churches. By contrast, if the 
plan invests some of its assets in companies because of their 
noninvolvement in South Africa, there will be no external effect on 
the plan. The performance of these companies will only affect the 
growth, or lack thereof, of the plan's assets. The economic fates of 
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these firms would not also affect the income of the employer organiza­
tion and, consequently, its capacity to make good on the promised 
pension benefits. 
In short, while the local social investment is most easily con­
ceived of in geographic terms, the externalities and lack of diversifica­
tion that typify this kind of investment can be present in other 
situations. 
An analysis of the proposal made to the state employees' pension 
plan makes a point, which, if perhaps obvious, nevertheless ought to 
be articulated: the mere existence of externalities cannot justify the 
local social investment. The externalities must be of sufficient magni­
tude to offset the lower direct return of that investment and must be 
captured by the fiduciary for the benefit of his beneficiaries. In the 
case of the proposal to the state pension plan, it appears that the pro­
posed investments do not generate adequate externalities and that the 
externalities that do result do not benefit the plan's beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the proposed investment should not be made. 
The externality to be realized from the low interest mortgages is 
increased tax revenue. That revenue will result from the sales tax col­
lected on the purchase of materials for homes that otherwise would 
not be built and from the real estate conveyance tax on sales that 
would not take place in the absence of the low-rate mortgage plan. 
However, none of these tax revenues will be shared with the plan par­
ticipants. The plan requires the state to contribute 5% of each par­
ticipant's current salary annually. An increase in tax revenue as a 
result of the mortgage program would not generate increased contri­
butions for the state's employees and thus does not counterbalance 
the depressed investment performance resulting from the low rate 
mortgages. Moreover, the state's financial position is reasonably good 
and, therefore, the strengthening of the state's revenues is, at best, of 
marginal importance to the plan participants. 
In addition, if low interest mortgages are granted with the plan's 
assets, the plan's rate of return will be lower than it otherwise would 
be. Consequently, the funds available for distribution to employees at 
retirement will also be less. 
For the plan participants, there is no need to examine this propo­
sal from the viewpoint of diversification since the rate of return (10% 
with no externalities) is so unappealing. 
VI. THE RECIPROCAL LOCAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
It would, of course, be possible to alter the facts of the foregoing 
examples and thereby shift their tone and emphasis. We could, for 
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example, postulate that a smaller portion of the university's endow­
ment has already been invested in downtown Westville and thereby 
reduce diversification problems with, and externalities from, the city's 
mortgage proposal. Or we could hypothesize greater problems quan­
tifying secondary benefits than are evident in my examples. 
Nevertheless, despite the possibility of tinkering with the details 
of my examples, they do establish the major points: local social invest­
ments are fundamentally different from global social investments. 
Despite a lower direct return, the local social investment can fre­
quently be highly productive since some of its externalities will inure 
to the benefit of the fiduciary's beneficiaries and thus increase the in­
vestment's rate of return. On the other hand, the local social invest­
ment will typically be among the least diversifying choices available to 
the fiduciary. 
The fiduciary confronted by proposals for local social invest­
ments could be paralyzed by this dilemma and respond by making no 
such investments at all. If he eschews all such local investments, the 
fiduciary runs no risk of managing an undiversified portfolio. 
The problem with this essentially negative approach is that the 
local social investment will, because of its externalities, often be 
highly productive. The defensive decision to eschew all local social 
investments may depress the fiduciary's rate of return below levels 
otherwise obtainable by ignoring a category of investments which may 
be among the most productive available. 
Nevertheless, the lack of diversification inherent in the local so­
cial investment cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. If the local 
social investment becomes unprofitable (a possibility that exists with 
any type of investment), the fiduciary may find himself in the uncom­
fortable position of defending an investment which he knew ab initio 
would decrease the diversification of his portfolio. Even if the fiduci­
ary is confident that he could ultimately justify his decision in the 
appropriate forums, the prospect of extended proceedings in the state 
or federal courts is not an attractive one. 
I suggest that there is a solution to the dilemma of the local so­
cial investment. That solution is for fiduciaries to reciprocate each 
other's local social investments. 
Let us reconsider the position in which our hypothetical univer­
sity finds itself. The mortgage proposal will undoubtedly enhance the 
university's real estate holdings. It will, however, further tie the uni­
versity's economic fortunes to those of Westville. Supppose, however, 
that the university knows of another institutional investor in a similar 
situation, e.g., the church organization. The university and the 
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church organization could enter into a contractual commitment to 
invest in each other's project: the church organization's pension plan 
would grant the mortgage for the renewal of downtown Westville 
while the university would extend mortgages to the churches affiliated 
with the organization. From the perspective of rate of return, this 
reciprocation of local social investments produces the same result as if 
each institution had invested in its own project. The university's re­
turn on the church mortgages will be the same as it would have re­
ceived on the investment in downtown Westville. The university will 
receive interest of 8%, plus the externalities derived from the church 
organization's extension of a mortgage in Westville that will benefit 
the university's real estate. By the same token, the church organiza­
tion's cash return on the Westville mortgage will equal the return it 
would have received on the mortgages to its affiliates. In addition, the 
organization, by deploying its assets in Westville, secures the benefits 
of the university's investment in its affiliated churches. 
Most importantly, the reciprocation by the university and church 
organization of their respective local social investments frees each 
from the diversification dilemma. The university will not be required 
to further concentrate its assets in Westville, but will invest in differ­
ent areas in different parts of the country. Similarly, the church or­
ganization can diversify some of its economic fortunes out of the 
ambit of its affiliated churches. 
In short, the reciprocation of local social investments mitigates, if 
not eliminates, the diversification problems inherent in such invest­
ments. By exchanging local social investments, fiduciaries can diver­
sify their portfolios while still guaranteeing that capital is deployed in 
projects that generate significant externalities for the fiduciaries' 
beneficiaries. 
As a practical matter, the establishment of a permanent, nation­
wide clearinghouse would be necessary to accomplish the reciproca­
tion of local social investments on a regular basis. On the simplest 
level, such a clearinghouse would permit various fiduciaries to learn 
of each other's existence and of the investments each desires to recip­
rocate. On a more complex level, the clearinghouse could play a role 
in arranging multiparty exchanges of local social investments. In my 
examples, the proposals to the church organization and the university 
are of exactly equal size: each has been requested to loan $10 million. 
On these facts, each can satisfy the other's needs by merely recipro­
cating between themselves. 
Suppose, however, that the proposal to the university is for a $12 
million mortgage. The church organization, still only needing $10 
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million for its purposes, might be reluctant to commit to Westville 
any more than the organization needs to have invested with its affili­
ated churches. Similarly, the university might prefer that an outside 
investor extend the entire $12 million mortgage rather than only part 
of it. 
One solution to this quandary is to coordinate a three-party ex­
change of local investments. The university could invest $10 million 
in church mortgages to be reciprocated by the church organization 
with a $10 million mortgage for downtown development in Westville. 
In addition, the university could invest another $2 million in the 
Elmtown mortgage proposal in return for a $2 million loan by the 
Elmtown home construction corporation to the Westville project. 
As we move from simple two-party exchanges to multiparty ar­
rangements, the role of the central clearinghouse becomes one of a 
broker, styling different packages in light of the various proposals reg­
istered with it. 
In its ultimate shape, the clearinghouse could form the 
equivalent of mutual funds, pooling a variety of local social invest­
ments into a single, internally-diversified investment vehicle. Sup­
pose, for example, that in any year there are forty fiduciaries with 
local social investment proposals totalling $100 million. Suppose fur­
ther that our hypothetical university's mortgage project is one of 
those proposals. 
The clearinghouse could organize a pool to which the university 
would contribute $10 million. In turn, the pool would extend the $10 
million mortgage to the developer for the rehabilitation of downtown 
Westville. Similarly, the remaining $90 million in the pool would be 
used to make the local investments desired by the other participating 
fiduciaries. 
For its $10 million, the university would thus secure the benefit 
of its local investment and a diversified pro rata interest in each of the 
other investments in the pool. 
In practice, assembling such a pool will not be without its diffi­
culties. Different investments contributed to the pool will generate 
different direct rates of return and will entail differing degrees of risk. 
Accordingly, potential investors may be willing to partake in some of 
the pool's investments, but not in others. The university may be will­
ing to extend a pro rata portion of the mortgage for Elmtown home 
buyers, but it may not be willing to invest in the mortgages for 
churches in low income areas. If we divide a single pool into smaller, 
separate pools, each with fewer investments, we increase the possibil-
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ity that any given pool may be acceptable to a potential investor, but 
simultaneously decrease the diversity within each smaller pool. 
In short, I do not minimize the practical problems involved in 
the establishment of mutual funds of local social investments. How­
ever, those problems do not seem insuperable or sufficient to preclude 
some initial experimentation with the establishment of such funds. 
Among the issues that must be considered are who would organ­
ize such a clearinghouse and who would pay for its operation. Per­
haps the most likely initial candidate is a foundation interested in 
social investing. If a foundation were to undertake to establish a 
clearinghouse and fund its initial period of operation, much useful 
information could be obtained, e.g., the number of institutions with 
projects to reciprocate; the total annual volume of local social invest­
ments contributed to the clearinghouse; the rate of return obtained by 
participants in the clearinghouse. 
In short, this initial period of experimentation, during which the 
administrative costs of the clearinghouse would be subsidized by a 
foundation, would indicate whether there is, in fact, a demand for the 
services of the clearinghouse and whether, without the foundation's 
funding, the clearinghouse could be a self-sustaining enterprise. 
If the results achieved by the clearinghouse are sufficiently 
favorable, the clearinghouse could be transformed into a self-financing 
organization. Institutions participating in the clearinghouse would 
pay fees designed to cover their respective shares of the clearing­
house's overhead. The clearinghouse would thus resemble a loaded 
mutual fund. Indeed, if the initial period of foundation-subsidized op­
eration indicated the feasibility of the clearinghouse as a self-sus­
taining entity, the organizers of commercial mutual funds might find 
it profitable to organize and operate such clearinghouses. 
Several financial organizations are examining the possibilities of 
establishing mutual funds for those concerned about socially sensitive 
investing. If the financial viability of a clearinghouse could be demon­
strated during a period of foundation-subsidized operation, these fi­
nancial organizations might consider forming clearinghouses for the 
reciprocation of local social investments. 
VII. QUANTIFICATION, PRUDENCE, AND NONECONOMIC 
BENEFITS 
The otherwise sympathetic reader may now feel compelled to in­
terject three reservations. First, it may be suggested that my analysis 
requires fiduciaries to project and quantify the externalities to be ob­
tained from proposed local social investments. Such prognostication 
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and quantification is somewhat problematic. Second, it may be ar­
gued that permitting fiduciaries to account for externalities could pos­
sibly lead them to advance their own social and political goals at the 
expense of their beneficiaries. Fiduciaries might simply predict exter­
nalities to justify and rationalize the fiduciaries' own policy prefer­
ences. Third, it may also be observed that my argument defines 
externalities in strictly financial terms and ignores the noneconomic 
benefits to be derived from potential investments. 
My argument does assume that fiduciaries can, within reason, 
predict the financial consequences of proposed local social invest­
ments and quantify those consequences. I presume, for example, that 
my hypothetical university can anticipate, with reasonable certainty, 
the financial impact upon its real estate holdings of the proposed 
downtown development project. Similarly, I assume that pension and 
profit-sharing trustees can predict, and quantify, the impact of pro­
posed investments upon the rates of return of the plans that the trust­
ees supervise. 
Predicting the future is problematic; quantifying the future, more 
so. Thus, it might be suggested that the impossibility of ever really 
knowing what externalities to expect makes it dangerous, if not im­
possible, for fiduciaries to consider those externalities in making in­
vestment decisions. 
To this concern, I advance two replies. First, there are tools 
available for making financial predictions of this type. It is impossible 
to read any major financial publication without perceiving the wide 
array of appraisal and investment analysis services available to 
investors.'" 
Second, and perhaps more compelling, my argument assumes no 
more (and no less) ability to predict and quantify the effects of poten­
tial investments than does current law. It is assumed by current law 
that the fiduciary can identify and invest in the most appropriate op­
portunities available to him. Fiduciaries are already required to prog­
nosticate about rates of return and appreciation of capital when they 
make investments. My analysis thus assumes no more competence to 
divine future trends than does existing law. 
In summary, the argument that fiduciaries will be required to 
predict and quantify the economic effects of local social investments 
proves too much. If such predictions and quantifications are beyond 
See, e.g., Pensions & Investment Age, Jan. 23, 1984, at 88 (advertisements for invest­
ment research); id. at 90 (monographs available from the Financial Analysts Research 
Foundation). 
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the competence of fiduciaries, then existing law, which presumes such 
competence as well, is similarly flawed. 
As to the argument that the prediction of externalities will be­
come an excuse for the fiduciaries' own policy preferences, I would 
observe that fiduciaries' predictions of expected externalities, like all 
of their other actions, are subject to the standard requirements of pru­
dence and loyalty. Hence, fiduciaries are required to predict secon­
dary economic benefits reasonably and in good faith, predicated on 
the financial well-being of the fiduciaries' beneficiaries. Thus, a 
breach of duty occurs either when a fiduciary predicts externalities 
from an investment without an adequate basis for such a prediction, 
or when he makes a prediction to advance his own political or per­
sonal agenda rather than the beneficiaries'. 
My argument does define externalities in strictly financial terms. 
I do not consider, for example, the possibility that the downtown de­
velopment project, by making Westville a more attractive place in 
which to live, will help the university recruit students or faculty.®' 
Similarly, I do not consider the possibility that a policy of noninvolve-
ment with firms tied to South Africa will make the university more 
enticing to a type of pupil or professor the university seeks to 
attract.®^ 
It is not that I deny that noneconomic benefits may exist from 
any social investment. It is, however, my position that we lack any 
firm consensus for identifying and evaluating these benefits and that, 
accordingly, we are not ready (if we ever will be) to account for these 
benefits in fiduciary law. 
The criteria for identifying and evaluating economic benefits are 
well established and essentially noncontroversial, largely because of 
their simplicity: a higher return is preferable to a lower return; capital 
appreciation is better than capital depreciation; more capital apprecia­
tion is better than less capital appreciation. 
No such consensus exists as to noneconomic criteria. One man's 
environmentalism is, for another, a bias against economic growth. 
I should note the theoretical possibility that a more attractive urban environment will 
allow the university to pay lower faculty salaries and charge higher tuition. If these economic 
benefits genuinely exist, they would increase the rate of return on the university's investment in 
downtown Westville. That, however, would still leave the question whether the noneconomic 
benefits vis-a-vis the university's student body and faculty ought be considered in the univer­
sity's decision to invest in downtown Westville. 
Similarly, if the adoption of anti-apartheid investment policies genuinely allows the uni­
versity to charge higher tuition or pay lower faculty salaries, that would be an economic exter­
nality to be considered by the university's trustees. However, the question of the noneconomic 
aspects of an anti-apartheid policy still remain. 
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Disengagement from South Africa is a moral imperative for some, a 
disservice to South Africa's black majority for others. Even the 
noneconomic consequences of the revitalization of downtown 
Westville are far from clear—potential students for the university's 
school of social work might prefer a different kind of environment for 
their research and practice. 
Hence, the omission of noneconomic benefits from my calcula­
tions is deliberate and, I suggest, defensible. Until there is a more 
widespread consensus as to the existence and extent of these benefits, 
we cannot tell fiduciaries to account for them.'^ 
CONCLUSION 
As the decade progresses, we can expect that, for many fiduci­
aries, the dilemma of the local social investment will grow more 
acute. As America's industrial heartland seeks to revitalize itself, as 
America's cities cope with the imperatives of economic renewal, and 
as America's states and municipalities confront the need to house 
America's next generation, the growing assets of foundations, endow­
ments, and pension and profit-sharing plans will represent an attrac­
tive source of capital with which to accomplish these tasks. 
It will not do to ritualistically reiterate fiduciaries' duty of loyalty 
to their beneficiaries and, on that basis, to decline all opportunities for 
local social investments. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the lo­
cal social investment will often be highly productive, sometimes more 
productive than the conventional deployment of assets by the fiduci­
ary. Blanket opposition to local social investments may thus result in 
significantly lower rates of return than would otherwise be obtainable. 
On the other hand, it will prove equally unsatisfactory to treat 
foundation, endowment, and pension and profit-sharing assets as 
freely available for any project that promotes the greater good of the 
commonwealth. Retirees have a legitimate expectation that the funds 
upon which they rely for postemployment income will be invested in a 
manner that secures their interests. Taxpayers who subsidize tax-ex­
empt institutions for particular purposes are similarly entitled to have 
those institutions satisfy the specific purposes for which exemption is 
granted rather than more generalized social goals that may or may 
not be appropriately financed by the federal treasury. 
The core of the problem is that the local social investment con-
This is not the place for a comprehensive jurisprudential analysis of the nature of fiduci­
ary relationships. For those interested in such an analysis, see Jacobson, The Private Use of 
Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 599 
(1980). 
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fronts the fiduciary with a dilemma. The local social investment may 
be among the most productive available to the fiduciary, since the 
investment's rate of return will include a portion of any externalities 
generated by the investment. However, it will be among the least di­
versifying available to the fiduciary since, in general, the fiduciary will 
already possess a significant investment in the locality. 
My solution to this dilemma might, in practice, prove rather 
complex. The reciprocation of local social investments is advanced, 
not because it can be done easily, but because it constitutes the only 
practical resolution of this quandary. To those who prefer an intellec­
tually purer or administratively simpler solution to the dilemma of 
the local social investment, I can do no better than declare that the 
solutions to important dilemmas are rarely pure and never simple.®'* 
O. Wilde, "The Importance of Being Earnest," Act One (John W. Luce & Co. 1906). 
